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Abstract 
 
The forensic investigation of cyber attacks and IT 
incidents is becoming increasingly difficult due to 
increasing complexity and intensify networking. 
Especially with Advanced Attacks (AT) like the 
increasing Advanced Persistent Threats an agile 
approach is indispensable. Several systems are 
involved in an attack (multi-host attacks). Current 
forensic models and procedures show considerable 
deficits in the process of analyzing such attacks. For 
this purpose, this paper presents the novel flower 
model, which uses agile methods and forms a new 
forensic management approach. In this way, the 
growing challenges of ATs are met. In the forensic 
investigation of such attacks, big data problems have 
to be solved due to the amount of data that needs to 
be analyzed. The proposed model meets this 
requirement by precisely defining the questions that 
need to be answered in an early state and collecting 
only the evidence usable in court proceedings that is 
needed to answer these questions. Additionally, the 
novel flower model for AT is presented that meets the 
different phases of an investigation process.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the last year’s industry, governments and 
institutions had to face more and more complex and 
enduring cyber-attacks, such as ThyssenKrupp [1] or 
RUAG [2]. Mandiant reported attacks on a wide 
spectrum of industries in 2015 [3]. The median 
number of days a threat group was active in a 
network before detection has been 205 days in year 
2014, where the longest presence was 2982 days. 
Such advanced attacks (AT) are long-running, 
complex and often have the goal to steal or destroy 
data. The know-how of the attackers is high and 
therefore the attacks are highly sophisticated and 
heterogeneous. Furthermore, the attack tool support 
for the attackers are getting more and more 
professionalized, whereas the development of 
forensic software is second-order driven. 
 
2. Problem Description 
 
Digital forensic is defined as analytical and 
investigative techniques used for the preservation, 
identification, extraction, documentation, analysis, 
and interpretation of computer media (e.g. data on 
SSD/HDD/DVDs, log data on host systems or log 
data for network activities). When it comes to ATs 
the amount of computer media that has to be 
analyzed in a forensic process is increasing. This is 
partly due to its long duration and persistence. ATs 
have a higher sophistication level as basic or 
moderate attacks and are more difficult to clarify. In 
particular through the cautious and covert approach, 
whereby slow progress from the attack side is 
consciously accepted in order not to be discovered. 
Forensic investigations of ATs therefore need to 
adapt to these characteristics. Classical forensic 
approaches that focus on individual systems 
(classical post-mortem forensic) and that collect all 
data in a first step and then try to extract hypotheses 
from this data is no longer expedient (shotgun 
forensic vs. sniper forensic [4]). This is because on 
the one hand not only individual systems are affected 
but also the communication between them (network 
forensic). On the other hand the amount of data 
becomes bigger and therefore big data analysis 
approaches are required that define questions asked 
in a first manner and then select the data that can 
answer them. 
Therefore a forensic approach for ATs is needed 
that is agile and takes network forensic as well as big 
data into account. Due to the complexity of ATs the 
new model also aims to fit the different steps a high 
sophisticated intruder makes during the attack. 
 
3. Related Work 
 
For a digital forensic model, it is important to 
guide the investigation process in a continuously 
transparent way. When it comes to ATs the model 
also needs to be flexible because of the heterogeneity 
of ATs. In the past, several forensic models have 
been presented. 
Du et al. [5] describe three phases in the current 
evolution of digital forensic process models. From 
2000 to 2010 general models have been defined, 
such as McKemmish's SAP model (secure, analyze, 
and present) in [6] or more detailed ones such as the 
extended model of cyber-crime investigation [7] that 
enhances the model of Casey [8] that provides a 
scientific basis for the digital forensic process. These 
early frameworks have a linear procedure in common 
and they do not take ATs and big data problems into 
account. 
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In the second phase, these models have been 
refined and the newer approaches focus on particular 
steps in the investigation process. In [9] Agarwal et 
al. present a model that focuses on computer fraud 
and cybercrimes. None of them do treat ATs or focus 
on big data issues. 
The third mentioned phase in [5] describes the 
recent research in this field. New technologies are 
taken into account such as cloud computing and 
internet of things (IoT). Some research has been 
done when it comes to big data and forensic. In [10] 
a framework for data reduction and data mining is 
presented that is not suggested to replace full 
analysis but serves to provide a rapid triage. They 
conclude that this approach is time consuming but 
has its advantages in the field of topic browsing. 
All of the presented work are collecting data first 
and then try to reduce the amount of data or extract 
the relevant evidence instead of defining the 
questions asked in a first step. None of the existing 
models meets the requirements for an agile sniper 
forensic model. Although these aforesaid approaches 
can be used as guide in our new model. 
 
4. Research Questions 
 
The forensic process faces many challenges when 
it comes to ATs. The characteristics of these kind of 
attacks create a big data scenario that has to be 
addressed in research. The heterogeneity of ATs also 
has to be taken into account for a forensic model. 
Therefore the following research questions are 
expected to be answered. 
 
1) What does the procedure look like when it 
comes to the forensic investigation of advanced 
attacks having regard to the heterogeneity of the 
attacks? 
2) How can the relevant data for the 
investigation process be identified and forensically 
usable extracted having regard to the relevant 
questions and considering the big data problems? 
3) How do host and network sensors (e.g. 
intrusion detection, network taps, etc.) have to be 
placed and forensically secured in the network to 
capture the needed data for the investigation 
process? 
 
5. Agile Sniper Forensics for Advanced 
Attacks Approach 
 
The novel approach focuses on the forensic 
investigation of advanced attacks and meets the 
modern challenges of an agile sniper approach. It 
consists of three parts: The two sub processes 
Investigation and Documentation as well as the novel 
flower model. 
 
5.1 Flower Model 
 
The flower model illustrates the attack procedure 
presented in Figure 1 taking Mandiant’s attack 
lifecycle [3] and Hutchins et al. intrusion kill chain 
[11] into account. The model separates the attack in 
two perspectives, Attacker and Target. This is 
because from a forensic process’ point of view in the 
step Initial Information Gathering an attacker uses 
public available information and legitimate tools and 
therefore this is hard to detect and to prove as part of 
the attack. Nevertheless, a regularly self-check to 
delete sensible public data or generatable information 
higher the attack difficulty for an intruder and should 
be part of the restoration process after the forensic 
investigation. 
 
Figure 1 Flower Model for attack step 
illustration 
The initial information gathering results in the 
initial compromise of the first target system. Each 
compromised system during the attack is represented 
as a flower (right hand side of the figure) with 
different steps as the flowers leaves. These represent 
the other phases of the attack such as escalating 
privileges after a successful compromise, 
maintaining access and control over the target 
through backdoors and the connection to a command 
and control server (C2), information gathering on 
the host and/or network, e.g. through several scan 
techniques, actions on objective such as data 
exfiltration and covering tracks. The arrow 
compound the result either of the attacker’s initial 
compromise or the action move from the perspective 
of a Target. ADs usually include multiple systems 
that are compromised due to lateral movement steps. 
These steps are illustrated by the move action in the 
Flower Model where the first compromised system’s 
(patient zero) Compromise action results from the 
initial compromise of the attacker. The model also 
takes into account that there can be more than one 
initial compromised system, which leads to multiple 
initial compromise actions, as well as more than one 
move action.  
The Target’s get connected to an attack graph that 
represents the involved compromised systems and 
illustrates the attack chain.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
5.2 Invesitgation and documentation method 
(IDM) 
 
The digital forensic process makes use of the 
flower model to comprehend the AT. Figure 2 shows 
this agile sniper forensic approach. 
 
 
Figure 2. Agile Sniper Forensic Model 
It is divided into two sub processes, Investigation 
and Documentation where these two processes exist 
simultaneously. The global management process 
starts with defining the general questions that need to 
be answered to forensically reproduce the AT. For 
each found compromised system, the questions 
related to it are defined and the sub processes are 
done. According to Greiner [12] examples for such 
questions are: 
 
 How did the attacker(s) get onto the 
system? 
 What did the attacker(s) do on the system 
and what did they steal? 
 How did the attacker(s) escape / move 
laterally? 
 How did the attacker(s) get the stolen data 
off the system? 
 
The Investigation sub process starts with 
collecting the data that is needed to answer the 
defined questions. These data can be rough 
categorized in host, network and misc. Sources of 
information are usually log files and temporary files 
as well as status information like timestamps, user 
rights, and processes. When it comes to AT the 
amount of data that needs to be analyzed is big. 
Therefore in our approach these data sources that are 
relevant to the defined questions need to be defined 
and only that data is collected. This subset of data 
than is filtered to get the specific data for the 
separate questions. It is examined so hypotheses can 
be developed that answer the defined questions.  The 
results are then checked with the found data.  
In parallel the Documentation sub process 
documents the investigation steps. The questions for 
extracting the necessary data as well as the steps to 
collect it are recorded. Therefore an official and 
common agreed process is mandatory, which is 
integrity securing. The collected data is stored with 
checksums and signatures in a matter that its 
integrity is provable. During the examination in the 
Investigation process the developed hypotheses also 
need to be documented. The last step is the reporting 
of the audit actions to verify the hypotheses.  
If more data is needed to answer the questions, 
other filters need to be applied, hypotheses are 
refuted, or new hypotheses are developed that need 
to be proven, these sub processes will be repeated 
until the answers to the questions are proven with the 
data. 
The whole process is also repeated until the initial 
attack vector for the compromised system is found 
and its origin (system or attacker) is found. The 
model is designed to adapt the questions depending 
on the found evidence on a system. This is to be 
agile on the steps taken by the attacker. Each 
compromised system is treated this way during the 
digital forensic investigation. The documentation 
builds the separate flowers from the flower model 
with its leaves and connects them so the complete 
attack is forensically reproducible in the report. 
 
6. Evaluation 
 
We analysed 21 technical reports on ADs ([2], 
[13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], 
[23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], 
[32]). These reports analysed one or more attacks 
that used similar types of malwares and tools per 
report. To show that an agile approach is needed we 
examined the amount of targets involved in such an 
attack and the steps taken by the attackers. 
The reports show that in all 21 cases multiple 
targets were part of the attacks. The six types of 
actions on a target – the leaves of the flower model – 
were also present on the analysed reports. The 
actions and tools used by the attackers were 
heterogeneous and targeted on their objectives. 
Therefore the forensic analysis process needs to be 
agile to the attack. The presented approach will be 
evaluated in more detail in a practical manner in 
future work. 
 
7. Conclusion and Next Steps 
 
In this proposal, the need for a digital forensic 
management approach for advanced attacks was 
pointed out. With the agile sniper forensic model 
processes were presented as a first step towards such 
a management approach. For the ease of 
reproducibility also the flower model was introduced 
that can be used for documentation purposes. 
In the next steps, this forensic approach has to be 
refined and tested in a practical manner. Therefore a 
specific tool support will be developed. It also has to 
be analyzed what techniques can be used to identify 
and extract relevant data and also where to place 
sensors to capture the relevant data. 
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